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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LlflE

PHILLIPS AND

RUBY PHILLIPS

Plaintiffs- appellants
vs.

fooELE

Case No. 12740

CITY CORPORATION

Defendant-Respondent

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
POINT I
The respondent in his brief has set forth a
nwnber of inaccurate allegations.

It is for this

reason that appellant deems it necessary to correct
I
I

said misleading statements.

1.

At page four of the respondent's brief

'under the statement of facts, the defendant states:
After observing the truck in that position,
Phyllis did not then again observe the
dwnp truck nor was she aware of it again
until it was in front of her(T.15) or at
the side of her (t.16) just prior to
colision.
This reading of the testimony of the
Plaintiff's driver was inaccurate, as the
stated.

(Tl5-14 J_.;..

I proceeding to go through and after I got
past where he was, he came out and •••
After more cross examination the Defendant's
ttorney twisted the words of the Plaintiff's
litness (T 16-L 3):
The next time you ob.served it when it was
in front of you, when it collided?

Q,

A.

When it was at the side of me.
The second error in the statement of

facts submitted in the Responc1.ent 1 s brief
is

re la ti ve to the point of impact of the

two vehicles.

Respondent characterizes the

to the vehicles as follows:
(Res. Brief p. 4 )
The damage began on the right fr0nt fender of
appellant's vehicle, where is (sic) apparently
came in contact with the left front bumper of
the Defendant's truck.
Appellant's submit that the testimony of
investigation officer Howard

Cooper,

and the pictures submitted in evidence of the

Appellant's automobile, clearly show that the
Defendant's garbage truck, struck the "Maverick
just behind the front wheel 11 (T 33-L 2) and that
the damage to the Appellant's vehicle characterized
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I the

Respondent as damage to the right front

rder, was caused by the force of the impact
the front wheels , "pushing the fender kind
Jforward on the Maverick" (T 33-L 21)
I

: The transcript of the trial does not
icate the part of the truck which hit the
erick behind the right front wheel, and the
egation by the Respondent that the damages
e done by the co]_ision of the right front
der of the Appellant's vehicle with the
-c

front bumper of the truck is unfounded

umptions .of the Respondent, not supported
the record on appeal.

3.

Respondent alleges that 11 The
Defendant's driver told the investigating
officer that as he approached the intersection
he looked to the left .and to the right and
continued on into the intersection and as
he looked to the left he saw the Appellant's
vehi_cle and was unable to stop prior to
collusion. ( R.Brief page 4 )
I

Appellant submits that the above statement
icates the proper duty of care for a vehicle
erincs an intersection following a stop, but
t this statement is not in· compliance with

icer Cooper 1 s testimony which is ·set forth
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I

;Jage 31 of the trial transcript as follows:

what did the driver of the garbage truck
;ell
you in regard to this ace ident?
l
jici.

says that as he approached the intersection
';e looked to his right but failed to look to
t11e left until too close to the intersection
stop and to avoid hitting the oncoming
ics.r from his left.
2:'/ise, on page 38 of the Trial Transcript
:e-direct the officer testified as follows:
Officer, you mentioned that the driver of
garbage truck said he did not look to
·c:1e le1nt?
yes.

it was too late to avoid the collusion

POINT II
pendent did not address it's self to the
stion of the Appellant 1 s position on appeal,
therefore Appellant assumes that there is
argument to the position that in reviewing the
g;:ient is this case, the Supreme Court must view
evidence in a light most favorable to the
ellant.
POINrl' III
Trial Court's Decision was based in full
provisions of _Utah Code Anno. 41-2-10,

' "'s to the tmpulation of the minor 1-S
-4·-·

negligence to the Pla.intiffs, there
no other statute referred to in the argwnent
council to the trial judge in the consideration
Defendant's motion to Dismiss, the provisions
Utah Code Anno.

(1953) having been

into the recbrd at the request of the
tl Judge.

( T. 64)

POINT IV
po11dent incorrectly states the rule on
i;ted contributory negligence in argument
;;1e !-:.ppellant 1 s cases cited in Point V of

Appellant's Brief.
Hespondent submits that California law
set forth in Solloway y_ Watts, 136 P. 2d
li.C. 1943) and Birnbawn v Blunt, 313 P 2d 87,

:u.

1957) should be followed

by

this court

order to impute contributory negligence to
Plaintiff 1 s herein, as well as the statutory
utation of liability of an adult signing an
hc:-lt.i.on for a minors dirvers lice:.nce, in
'er to bar the recovery of the parent-owner
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,1

c:.n action to recover damages sustained by

parent frorn. a contributorily negligent
';d party.
Both of the cases cited by Respondent were
ided prior to the 1967 amendment to the
1i:iornia Vehicle Code, which has over ruled
decisions by legislation.
Section 17150 of the California Vehicle
·e provides as follows:
Every owner of a motor vehicle is
lic-,ole and responsib.le for death or
injury to person or property resu.lting
froo a negligent or wrongful act or
oHrnission in the operation of the motor
vehicle in the business of the owner or
otherwise by any person using or operating
the same with the permission, express or
implied ,of the owner.
Prior to this provision, the California
tion above cited contained the following
at the end of the paragraph:
und the negligence of such person shall
be imputed to the ovmer for all purposes
of civil damages.
The Leg.isla ti ve Conuni ttee Com:ment of the
,ote is set forth in West 1 s Annotated California

·e:J under the section above quoted, which states:
The last clause of section 17150 has been
deleted because it • • • prevented an

-6-

veriicle O\·rner from recoverinr;
•· 11y damac;es for re. persot1ill injury
the
negligence of his
and a
person. Instead of
an owners' cause of action in
s u.cn Ct co.s e, Sec. 17150 as amended permits
to recover his damages from the
necligent third person.
Section 17708 of the California Vehicle
2,

Telates "'c,o tne liability of a parent
rdian and as amended 1967 reads as follows:
r.r<f civil lic_:.oili·C.y o7 a minor wi1ether
li.ce:nced or not under th.is code, arising
ov.G of his drivinc; a moto:c vehicle upon
hic;hviay with the express or implied
)e.:Lission of the parents • • • is hereby
.'..,.rposed upon the parents, • • ••
shall
jc
and severally liable with the
for any damages proximately resulting
the negligent or wrongful act or
01:i;·:iis s ion of the minor in driving a motor
vehicle.

I

The Law revision Commission Comment-1967,

f fortri
0

I

in West Annotated California Codes
the

above quoted statute states:

same reasons which justify the deletion

"Che provision for imputed contributory negligence
!

:.; section 17150 justify the removal of the

r·uc"l'
I

i_Jrovisions from section 17708.
v. Wc..tts, supro., is now refered

in the notes of decisions in West Anno. Calif

es, following the above set forth statute as

-7-

i'ie 10.v1 prior to the amendr:1ent 11

m.:o.h law does not contain the language

the California legislature found necessary
c!elete from the law due to the Court holdings
the cases cited by Respondent.

Utah legislatures and the Courts of this
'.te h2. ve refused to impute negligence beyond

e l:'..1:1its of the master-servant doctrine, and
eprovisions of Utah Code Anno. 41-2-10 and
-2-22.

Respondent urges this Court to now

the iraputed negligence set forth by
for the liability of a minor, to bar
covery by the imputation of contributory
This urging of the Respondent
ing presented by the use of case law of

lifornia, now of no force and effect due
I

t:1e corrective legislation, and surely This
should not be mislead by the Respondent
to the prevailing opinions on the issue of

contributory negligence.
This Court has been of the firm position

at the only negligence which can be imputed

-8-

a po.rent must be in complete compliance

,:1 the statute.
U

In Mugleston v Glaittli,

238, 258 P 2d 438 (1953) this Court

ted:

The one real question raised by defendant on
appeal is whether a parent who is absent and
who has not directed the son to use the
automobile, nor consented to its use, is
guilty of negligence which will support
a judgment against him. We believe he
is not.
In Mugleston, the testimony revealed that
son had been given permission to drive the
ily vehicle within the yarl of the family

by the owner of the car, the father,
that the parents had not given the child
sent to drive the car upon the public streets.
Court had before it the consideration of
application of the identical statute now
effect, Utah Code Anno. 41-2-22, and refused
extend the liability of the

for the

'ld 1 s negligent use of the family vehicle

an accident, to the parents where it
ld not be shown that the father "knowingly"

rnitted the minor to drive the vehicle upon
ighway.

-9-

Appellant submits that the use of the
in this instant matter by Utahna Perkins
snot with the permission or knowledge of the

aintiff Luke Phillips ( T-44)
Q • Did you tell your daughter--your

wife's daughter she could use the ear?

A.

No , I didn't.

Q. Had you ever told your wife's daughter
she could use the car?
P•• No.

Q.

We.re you home on the afternoon?

A.

No, I was working • • • •

Respondent further assets that the holdings
S_;cured Finance Co. v._Chicago,Rock Island,
N. W. 88 (Iowa 1909)

d Pacific Rail way Co. ,

ould be followed by this Court to bar recovery

the owner plaintiff, by imputation of a

or's contributory negligence.
Obviously, Respondent negligently failed
ascertain whether the above case was the law
Iowa today.

Secured Finance Co. v Chicago, R.I, and Pac
Co., supra, has been overruled by the Iowa
Prer11e Court in 1956 by the decision of
-10-

v Pilgrim, 74 N.W. 2d 212, wherein
Court stated:
2inance C.Q_. v Chicago R. I • & P.R.
20r( Iowa, 1105, 224
88; Rogers v
Jef:t'erson, 224 Iowa 324, 275 NVJ 874, L"l re
Istate of Green, 224 Iowa 1268, 278 N.W. 285,
2.ll supra, and any other Iowa case to the
same effect are overruled in so far as they
hold the contributory negligence of the
consent driver of a motor vehicle is imputed
to the ovmer as a matter of law. • •
A subsequent Iowa case, Houlahan v. Brockmeier

N."W. 2d 5LJ-5 , Iowa (1966)in an action brought

father ovmer to recover damagea _from a third
iy, wherein the Court found the driver son
ie contributorily negligent, but that the

al Court erred in imputing such negligence to

Plaintiff, the Court stated:
He once recognized what is commonly
referred to as the both-ways test,
imputing contributory negligence of
the driver to the
of a consent
driven vehicle. But in 1956 this
venerable concept was abandoned.
The Iowa Supreme Court, in considering
) action to over rule the both-ways test
;,mart v Pilgrim, supra, considered the fooowing
of the Minn e3ota Supreme Court, and
New York Court of Appeals

-11-

Christensen v Hsnnepin 'I'rans·o Co., 215
;;11

394, 10 NI'T 2d 406, (

) which Court

,ated. :
The very reason for holding the consenting
oimer liable for negligence of the operation
of his automobile, that of furnishing
financial responsibility to an injured
po.,r-ty is completly absent in the owners
act.ion to recover for damages sustained
by him as a result of the concurrent
negligence of the operator and the third
party.
TlA:cefore, it is non sequitur to say that,
because the policy of the statute is to
impose li<1bility against the bailor it
also is its policy to impute to him the
negligence of his bailee.

In 1962, the North Da1rnta Supreme Court
the family purpose doctrine in effect
.that state; with the statutory purposes of
!·111

and Minnesota, upon which the previously cited

ses of Stuart v Pilgrim,and Christensen v

menin Transp Co.

were based.

In Michaelsohn v Smith, 113 N. W. 2d 571
t-) (1962) the owner of a family automobile which

s dimageC in an intersection collision with
othi:;r vehicle while the owner's minor son was

ivin13 the family automobile, instituted an action
-12-

the driver of the other automobile to
over the damages to his car.
,t

The trial

entered judgment awarding the Plaintiff
to his car, and the Supreme Court

;irmed, holding that the son's contributory
lic;enq;es was not imputable to the Plaintiff,
Court stated :
The family purpose doctrine and the
f:incmcial responsibility statutes such
Ci,G those of Iowa, and Minn. have their
o::c.ic;in in an identical pub.lie policy,
that of giving an injured party, who
is free of negligence a cause of action
a::;ainst a financially responsible
defendant. 1
The doctrine was an extension of previously
established rules of liability in order
1
t,0 0.dvance the dictates of natural justice. 11
It 1 s application, therefore, should only be
coextensive with
purpose. To extend
the doctrine to deny the right of a nonnegligent car mrner to recover from a
negligent driver of another car would
defeat the public policy the doctrine is
intended to serve. It is our view, therefore, that the negligence of Austin
Michaelsohn( the son) if any, may not be
imputed to W. E. Michaelsohn (the plaintiff)
Mills v Gabrial, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 NYS

78, affirmed 31 N.E. 2d 512 (1940) is the
dinar:t\.

case of refusal to extend statutory
to bar recovery of a non-negligent
-13-

,.er against a negligent thir.d party,

en the owners driver is contributorily
•ligent.

The Court therein stated:

The purpose of the statute was to
change the conunon-la:w rule by 11 making
the 01vner liable r'o:i.· the negligence
of a person legally operating the car
the permission, express or implied
of the owner.: 11 (citations omitted) • • •
Tne statute does not
the commonluw rule respecting the owner's right to
recover frorn third persons under the
circwnstanccs disclosed by the record.
Nor mD.y it be invollced for the purpose of
imputine the operators' ne3ligence to the
O\mer, It is applicD.ble for that purpose
only in action brought by third persons
the owner • ( emphasis added)
Mills v Gabrial, has been followed by
·!

sebsequent appellant Court decisions in

rYork since 1940, and is controlling law
ay.

In Molino v County of Putnam, 272 NE 2d 323

n

2d

44 (1971) the Court stated:

The statute which imputes to an absentee
owner the negligence of his driver for the
purpose of imposing liability to an injured
third party, does not impute contributory
nec;ligence to such an absentee owner in
his action to recover his 01m damage.
Ctlso:
uoe11

Contj nental Auto Lease Corpora tj on y
1

N. Y. 2d

0

280 NYS 2d 123

227 N.E.

18· Brooks v Horning, 27 AP 2d 874, 278 N. Y.s .2d

-14-

i

has also cited to this Court the

fstI"ict of Columbia case of National Trucking

,a Storci.ge Company y_ Driscoll, 64 A. 2d
',C.

( ·

This case was decided by the D.C.

urt under the financial responsibility statute,

,C. Code 1940 Sec.

It provided that

driver operating 1motor vehicle with the
nsent of the 01-mer should, in case of accident

e deemed to be the agent of the owner 11 •
der the Utah holdings of master-servant
ency cases, the contributory negligence of
e agent has always been imputed to the master
bar the recovery of the 01-mer of a vehicle

ing driven by the agent on the owners business,
d &ppellants submit that the same doctrine of
ency prescribed by statute under the D. C. Code
not diverse from the common-law doctrine in
ie limited area

by th:is Court.;

it is to be noted, that there is
applicable statute in the State of Utah,
Ply the holdings of Nat.iona1 Trucking beyond

e common-law master-servant doctr.ine.

-15-

Loui.'J ian2 law, upon which Dileo v
•iontier

195 So 74 (la.App. 1904); and

ntenot y_ Pan American Fire
d 105

Co., 209 So

(La) which are cited by respondent is

follows:
CC Article 2318
The father, or after his decease, the
mother, are responsible for the damage
occasioned by their minor or unemancipated
children, residing with them, or placed
by them under the co..re of other persons,
reserving to them recourse against those
persons.
Uto.11

ha::; no such statute, and the holdings

sed upon such law are inapplicable to the

case. However, it may be noted in
nnection with the

cases? that the

preme Court of that state has refused to
the negligence of a minor son, who was
iving his mother's car, to bar her recovery

Go.spard v Le .Maire, 158 So 2d 149 (1963)
cause the father was not deceased.

The

urt stated:
11

The negligence of one person cannot be
1mputed to another person not guilty of
personal negligence in the absence of a
lesal obligation on the part of the
latter to respond for the fault of the
former.

-16-

Respondent submitted to this Court that
had presented two

he

solated cases

hid1 respondent characterized as the

11

minori ty

osition" J and that the respondent had presented
he prevailing opinion on imputation of Contributory

set forth in their original
rief the two cases which are directly in

with the instant matter before this Court
stern-ren et al Vs KingJ 99 A. 2d 356 (Del-1953)
ci York.

v. Day's Inc.,

A 2d 730 (Me 1958)

e language of the statutes in question are
'ilost identical to the Utah laws, and Appellant
ges this Court to review the policies and

asoning of those cases.

It should be noted

hc;.t Westergrer., was decided before the Iowa
urt overruled Secured Finance Co. v Chicago

.I. 2md P Railway Co., supra.
No longer is the position the appellant's
ge this Court to adopt, in the minority.

Court hus not had occassion previously to
le on the issue of imputed contributory

egligence under the motor vehicle statutes
-17-

.volved in the instant matter.

Appellants

uorJit that the preferable view to be adopted

this Court is that contributory negligence
ould not be imputed to the owner under the
otms of statutes discussed herein.

The

octrine of contributory negligence sho-gld

ot be extended to apply vicariously to an
!ilOCent party.
In summary, Appellant's represent that
spondent has cited for this Court cases which
ve either teen over-ruled, .made inapplicable

'amendrnent to legislation, or are based
on statutes which are substantially disto the provisions of Utah Code Anno.,
or to the provisions which Respondent
·1eges the Trial Court based it's decision

on, Utah Code Anno. ( 1953) 41-2-22.
CONCLUSION
is Court should reverse the Judgment of

n-Sui t, and remand the matter to the
Court for a determination by a
·y, as to whether the Plaintiff's vehicle

-18-

was
t

I

I

t

rec

1

the negligence of the
. te
• • l1. was t'ne proxima
s agen "c, wnic

of the Defendant 1 s damages,; and further
forth the rule to be applied by the

110\'ler court, that the contributory negligence,

'I any,

of a minor driver cannot be imputed

,, 0 the

ovmer of a vehicle to bar recovery

J

'

fby such 01-mer against negligent third parties.

Respectfully submitted,
Myrna Mae Nebeker
Attorney for Appellant
212 Phillips Petroleum Bldg ••
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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